For a PDF copy of the full Missouri whitepaper, please click here
Missouri’s statutory scheme does much to protect life from conception to natural death, but falters on bioethics issues. The current Supreme Court, the few times it has heard cases involving life issues, has been deferential to the state’s policies respecting the sanctity of human life.
The Missouri Supreme Court has had little to say in the state’s efforts to maintain pro-life legislation and policies because most of the state’s prolific pro-life legislation has been challenged in federal, rather than state court. In the 2006 case, Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v Nixon, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an informed consent and waiting period law when Planned Parenthood challenged it as vague and violative of the rights of liberty and privacy. The Court held that the statute simply codified the common law of informed consent, a duty that has been recognized under law for almost 100 years. The Court also pointed to the United States Supreme Court upholding a 24-hour waiting period and found no reason to construe the Missouri Constitution more broadly than the federal one.
The Missouri law creating a civil cause of action against any person who intentionally causes, aids or assists a minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent was challenged in 2007 in Planned Parenthood of Kansas & Mid-Missouri v Nixon. The Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “aid or assist” narrowly to exclude speech or expressive conduct. Thus construed, the statute does not bar providing information or counseling and does not violate the First Amendment. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause or due process rights of non-Missouri health care providers because it did not apply to wholly out-of-state conduct. The Court also held that the statute was not an undue burden on abortion rights nor did it violate the right by travel.
In the 2006 case Shipley v Cates, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that Planned Parenthood affiliates would not be required to repay almost one million dollars in state family planning grants awarded in violation of the state’s prohibition on funding for affiliates of abortion providers.
Over the past century, the Missouri Supreme Court has grappled with the issue of whether the unborn are protected from criminal violence. In the 1913 case Buel v United Railways Company of St. Louis, the Court held that a child who was born alive but later died of prenatal injuries could not bring a statutory claim for wrongful death. The Court reversed Buel in 1953, holding in Steggall v Morris that a child dying of prenatal injuries after birth was a “person” capable of supporting a wrongful death cause of action.
In 1976, the court held in State ex rel. Hardin v Sanders that a viable stillborn child was not a “person” capable of sustaining a wrongful death claim, distinguishing it from Steggall on the grounds that a fetus does not become a person until live birth. In 1983, the Court considered the same issue in O’Grady v Brown that it had in Hardin and determined that such an unborn child was a person. The court rejected the argument that it must strictly construe the statute and preclude the unborn from protection, stating that it was going to “apply the statutory language with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative enactment.”
In the 1990 case Rambo v Lawson, the Court considered whether a nonviable fetus had a cause of action for wrongful death. A plurality of the Court held that the legislative purpose of the statute would not be served by including nonviable fetuses within the definition of a covered “person” and did not extend the holding of O’Grady. In 1992, the Court considered whether a viable fetus who died in the womb is a “person” within the meaning of the involuntary manslaughter statute and held in State v Knapp that the statutory definition of person that included the unborn from the time of conception informed the manslaughter statute, so the defendant was guilty of causing the death of a viable fetus.
In 1995, the Court held in Connor v Monkem that a parent may state a claim for the death of a nonviable, unborn child because the legislature intended the courts to interpret “person” within he wrongful death statute in light of the statute defining “person” as beginning at conception.
Under Missouri law, the knowing assistance of another in self-murder is voluntary manslaughter. There are no reported Missouri Supreme Court decisions interpreting this statutory provision. Missouri has a living will statute that enables any competent person to direct the withholding or withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures. That was not intended to condone, authorize or approve mercy killing or euthanasia.
In Cruzan v Harmon, the Court addressed the question of whether a guardian may order that food and water be withheld from an incompetent ward in a persistent vegetative state. The Court looked to the living will statute as an expression of the state’s policy regarding the sanctity of life and held that absent clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence, no person could assume the choice refuse life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under the living will statutes.
Missouri statutes make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for failure to participate in an abortion, for a public or private college, university or hospital to discriminate against a person for refusal to participate in an abortion, and for a school to require a person to pay fees that would fund an abortion if doing so would violate the person’s conscience or beliefs.
Missouri law also allows hospitals and medical personnel to refuse to treat or admit a woman for the purpose of an abortion. Missouri law does require health carriers or health benefit plans providing pharmaceutical coverage to include coverage for contraceptives, but does prove an exemption for moral, ethical or religious beliefs or tenets to the contrary. No Missouri state courts have reviewed these statutes.
In 2006, Missouri voters passed the “Missouri Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative” effectively preventing the legislature from criminalizing embryonic stem cell research or from denying funds on the basis that recipients engage in such research. The definition of “cloning” merely prohibits cloning for reproduction but not cloning for research. The Court has heard no cases on the issues of human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research.
Almost every Missouri Supreme Court decision on life issues is issued per curiam, making it difficult to determine the judicial philosophies of the individual judges. Though the Court has tended to interpret statutes dealing with life issues strictly, thus effectuating the intent of the legislature, the Court has displayed activist tendencies and a willingness to push the boundaries of the proper judicial role on other issues.
The Missouri Supreme Court consists of seven members. The chief justice is called “justice” while the other members of the court are called “judges.” The governor selects judges after nomination from a nonpartisan judicial commission. After one year in office, the judges must be retained by a majority vote in the next general election. Judges serve 12-year terms but must retire at age 70. The Missouri Supreme Court White Paper contains a table of biographical information for each current member of the Court.
For a PDF copy of the full Missouri whitepaper, please click here