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United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) |
Five justices (Black, Burger, Harlan, White, Blackmun) upheld the constitutionality of the criminal abortion statute of the District of Columbia (which prohibited abortion "unless . . . necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health") against an attack that it was "unconstitutionally vague." But the decision indicated weak support for abortion statutes among the justices, and laid the foundation for the broad definition of "health" in Doe v. Bolton in 1973. |
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) |
By a 7-2 vote, the Court struck down Texas's criminal abortion statute, prohibiting abortion except where necessary to preserve maternal life, declaring for the first time that the "right of privacy" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right of a woman to decide "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Also held that the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn. The decisions in Roe and in Doe v. Bolton (below) invalidated the abortion laws of all 50 states. |
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Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) |
Companion to Roe v. Wade. By a vote of 7-2, the Court invalidated Georgia's abortion "reform" statute that authorized abortion only where continued pregnancy would endanger a woman's life or health, including mental health, where the fetus would likely be born with a serious defect, or where pregnancy resulted from rape. Also invalidated requirements that abortion be performed in accredited hospitals and that two physicians confirm the performing physician's judgment of "necessity" for the abortion. Doe is frequently cited for its unlimited definition of maternal "health." Because Roe authorized abortion even after viability for the "life or health" of the mother, the following definition of "health" makes abortion-on-demand available through all nine months of pregnancy: "[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). |
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Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) |
Invalidated the application of a Virginia statute that prohibited the advertisement of abortion. |
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Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) |
Upheld Connecticut anti-abortion statute as it applies to non-physicians. |
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Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) |
Held that physicians may challenge abortion-funding restrictions on behalf of their female patients seeking abortions. Has had enormous impact upon abortion litigation by allowing abortion providers and clinics to challenge state abortion laws, as plaintiffs, instead of individual women patients, as was the case in Roe v. Wade. |
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Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I) |
Unanimous decision holding that the district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts parental consent statute until the state court had interpreted the statute. |
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Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) |
Upheld definition of "viability" under state statute and requirement that women sign a consent form prior to abortion. Invalidated provisions requiring consent of spouse to abortion, requiring consent of parents for abortion performed on minor daughter, prohibiting use of saline amniocentesis abortion procedure, and requiring those performing abortions to exercise professional skill and care to preserve the life of the fetus. |
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Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) |
Upheld a Connecticut prohibition of the use of public funds for abortions, except those that are "medically necessary." The statute was challenged on grounds of due process and equal protection based on claim that a state that provides Medicaid funds for childbirth must also fund abortion. The Court reasoned that the state is free to use its power of funding to encourage childbirth over abortion. The Court noted "a woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to term as to choose to abort it." |
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Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) |
Companion to Maher v. Roe. Upheld a Pennsylvania statute that restricted the use of Medicaid funds for abortion to those that are "medically necessary," rejecting challenge that this policy violates Title XIX of the Social Security Act. |
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Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) |
Third in the series of 1977 abortion funding cases. Upheld St. Louis policy against performance of abortion in public hospitals. |
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Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) |
Struck down, as unconstitutionally vague, a Pennsylvania statute that required physicians to use abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be born alive in abortions after viability. |
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Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II) |
This case sets the standard for parental consent for minors seeking abortion. The Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that required a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion. Held that states requiring the consent of parents to abortions upon minors must afford minors an alternative opportunity for authorization of the abortion (judicial bypass) where the minor may demonstrate that either she is mature and well-enough informed to make her own abortion decision, or if not mature, that the abortion would nonetheless be in her best interests. |
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Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) |
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court decision on abortion between Roe and Casey. By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which restricts federal funding of Medicaid abortions only to cases of life endangerment (and, since 1994, rape or incest at behest of Clinton administration). The Court also held that states participating in the Medicaid program are not required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act to fund "medically necessary" abortions for which there is no federal reimbursement under the Hyde amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that government could distinguish between abortion and "other medical procedures," because "no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life." In upholding the Hyde Amendment, the Court rejected claims that the federal restriction on abortion funding was invalid as a denial of due process, equal protection, freedom of religion, and as an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment. |
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Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) |
Companion to Harris v. McRae. Upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting the use of state funds for abortions except where necessary to save the woman's life. |
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H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) |
The Court upheld a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify a minor's parent before performing an abortion. |
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City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron I) |
Invalidated informed consent provisions of a city ordinance that required physicians to give their patients information on medical risks of abortion, fetal development, and abortion alternatives; required a 24-hour waiting period; required that all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital; required parental consent for a minor with no judicial bypass; and required physicians to dispose of fetal remains in a "humane and sanitary manner." |
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Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) |
Companion case to Akron I. Court invalidated a Missouri statute that required all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital. However, the Court upheld requirements that (1) a second physician be in attendance during a post-viability abortion; (2) a minor obtain either parental consent or a judicial waiver; and (3) a pathology report be made for each abortion. |
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Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) |
The Court affirmed a Virginia Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of a doctor for unlawfully performing an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a licensed hospital. Noting that Virginia's definition of "hospital" included outpatient clinics, the Court held that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics was constitutional as a reasonable means of furthering the state's compelling interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety. |
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Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) |
In this 5-4 decision, the Court invalidated provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that required (1) that physicians must give their patients informed consent information on fetal development and medical risks of abortion; (2) informational reporting requirements; (3) a physician to use the method of abortion most likely to preserve the life of a viable unborn child; and (4) the attendance of a second physician at a post-viability abortion (without medical emergency exception). |
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) |
In this 5-4 decision, the Court upheld provisions of a Missouri statute that (1) prohibited the use of public facilities or public personnel to perform abortions and (2) in pregnancies of 20 weeks or more, requiring ultrasound tests to determine viability of the unborn child by measuring gestational age, weight, and lung maturity. |
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Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) |
Invalidated a Minnesota law requiring a two-parent notification without a procedure for judicial bypass of the notice requirement. However, the Court upheld another provision that required two-parent notification but did include a procedure for judicial waiver, as well as a 48-hour waiting period for minors. |
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Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II) |
Rejecting a facial challenge, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that required a minor to notify one parent or obtain a judicial waiver. The Court rejected the abortion clinic's claim that the judicial procedure was burdensome. |
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Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) |
The Court upheld federal regulations prohibiting personnel at family planning clinics that receive Title X funds from counseling or referring women regarding abortion. |
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) |
By a sharply divided vote of 5-4, the Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe. The Court upheld provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that required (1) physicians to provide patients with informed consent booklets, including medical risks of abortion and childbirth as well as pictures of the unborn child at various stages of development; (2) a mandatory 24-hour reflection period following receipt of information; (3) the filing of abortion reports for statistical compilation, including information such as age of woman, gestational age of aborted child, and reason for abortion; and (4) a one-parent consent requirement for minors with a judicial bypass. The Court explicitly overruled parts of Akron I (1983) and Thornburgh (1986).
The plurality opinion of three Justices reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe that prior to viability a woman's right to abortion cannot be restricted. The plurality, however, abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to fundamental rights for a new "undue burden" standard of review, which these restrictions passed. Two Justices voted to continue subjecting state restrictions to strict scrutiny. These five Justices voted to strike down a spousal notice requirement. Four Justices voted to uphold all challenged provisions and overturn Roe completely. |
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Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) |
The Court denied a stay of the district court opinion pending appeal. The lower courts had concluded that the applicants, challengers of the North Dakota Abortion Control Act, were unable under United States v. Salerno to demonstrate "that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged provisions] would be valid." In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the lower courts' use of Salerno was inconsistent with Casey, insisting that the proper analysis was whether, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo abortion." |
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Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) |
On a facial challenge, the Court upheld that Montana's parental notice statute on "assumption that a judicial-bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests is equivalent to a judicial-bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion without notification is in her best interests." |
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Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam) (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer dissented) |
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld Montana's statute "restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians" only ("physician-only" requirement). |
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Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) |
By a vote of 5-4, the Court struck down Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion and the partial-birth abortion prohibitions of 29 other states. The Court concluded that key statutory terms were unconstitutionally vague such that it would affect not only partial-birth abortion, but also other constitutionally-protected second-trimester abortion methods. The Court also found the statute invalid for lack of a "health" exception. Strongly worded dissenting opinions were filed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. |
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Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S.Ct. 961 (2006) |
The Court unanimously reversed a lower court decision which invalidated New Hampshire's parental notice law in its entirety, and remanded the case for future consideration. |
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) |
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003. The Court effectively threw out Stenberg and restored the guidelines set forth in Casey that are more deferential to state legislation. The Court also held that the federal ban did not require a health exception, in essence because other alternatives existed. Further, the Court appears to have narrowed the unlimited health exception in Doe v. Bolton, focusing instead on "significant health risks." This focus effectively rejects the contention that an unlimited health exception is required for every abortion regulation.
In addition, the Court made some important findings regarding informed consent, stating that "it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained," and noting that "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow." The USSC went on to conclude that "[t]he State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed." These acknowledgements pave the way for states to promulgate more restrictive informed consent laws. |